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Abstract
The paper demonstrates possibilities of both convergence to the steady state and
emergence of stable growth cycles around it in a simple macrodynamic model of debt-
financed investment-led growth. The growth cycles are robust and are generated en-
dogenously, either due to the existence of a supercritical Andronov-Hopf bifurcation, or
due to the global stability condition through an application of the Poincare´-Bendixson
theorem. The emergence of multiple limit cycles is also observed under certain condi-
tions. The possibility of a deterioration of financial variables during a boom, with the
resulting financial crisis providing an endogenous ceiling to a business cycle is examined
in this context.
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1 Introduction
The primary objective of this study is to investigate whether the macrodynamics of debt-
financing investment can provide an endogenous explanation for emergence of growth cycles
in demand-constrained closed economies. In addition, we also attempt to examine the pos-
sibilities of economic crises, especially of financial origins, emerging as a by-product of such
growth cycles.
The basic motivation for this study comes from our observation of a two-way causality
between the real and the financial sector. A simple interaction between the multiplier and the
accelerator in a demand-constrained closed economy might lead to a monotonic movement
of output and investment. Such models, therefore, would require exogenous ceilings and
floors to stay bounded. In the presence of financial factors, however, an expansion of output
and investment (or the rates of growth thereof) might, under certain conditions, lead to
deterioration of certain financial variables. This, in turn, might lead to creation of conditions
under which the initial increase in investment might be depressed. If suitably modeled, this
might provide us with an endogenous explanation of growth cycles, with the real and the
financial variables chasing each other.
One area of particular interest in the above story of growth cycles is the possibility of
complications arising from the borrowers defaulting on their payment commitments. A sub-
stantial literature in this area suggests that the lenders, when faced with the possibility
of the borrowers defaulting under conditions of market imperfections like incomplete and
asymmetric information, might adopt non-market-clearing methods like red-lining and ra-
tioning credit and thus discriminate between various borrowers based on some assessment of
their creditworthiness.1 There is also a substantial literature, influenced by the contributions
of Fisher (1932, 1933) and Minsky (1975, 1982, 1986, 1994), which argues that there is a
general tendency for expansion of credit to lead to a deterioration of the financial variables
in the economy during periods of boom and prosperity. A financial crisis follows, which
is then followed with a contraction of the real sector as well, putting an end to the boom
phase. The interaction between the real and the financial sector, therefore, leads us to an
endogenous explanation for bounded systems and growth as well as financial cycles. Minsky’s
contribution, in particular, has influenced a huge literature on debt-deflation and financial
crisis. Kindleberger’s (1978) interesting and influential account of financial cycles, for in-
stance, is influenced by Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. Similarly, there is a huge
literature of economic models on financial fragility, which originates in an attempt to model
1See, for instance, Keynes (1930), Hodgman (1960), Catt (1965), Jaffee & Russell (1976), Stiglitz &
Weiss (1981, 1983, 1992), Jaffee & Stiglitz (1990).
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at least some aspect of Minsky’s descriptive account.2 However, the popularity and huge
interest in Minsky’s work notwithstanding, a critical component of Minsky’s story, consist-
ing of uncertainties regarding realization of profits and its consequent impact on repayment
of debt commitments, is described at the microeconomic level. In a demand-constrained
economy, a higher investment translates to a higher level of macroeconomic profits through
the operation of the multiplier. Hence, there is no straightforward way to aggregate the
above story of problems arising out of uncertainties faced by individual firms over realiza-
tion of profits from investment to the macroeconomic level. An alternative story is required,
therefore, to explain why during a prolonged boom there is a steady shift among firms from
hedge towards speculative and ponzi financial postures, increasing the overall indebtedness
and leverage in the economy and eventually leading to a financial crisis putting an end to
the boom. This is one of the questions which we attempt to address in this paper.
We begin by introducing the model in section 2 before proceeding to discuss some of the
preliminary results in section 3. In section 4 we explore cyclical possibilities. The main
economic interpretations of these results are provided in section 5. Finally we reconsider the
Fisher-Minsky hypothesis in light of these results in section 6.
2 Basic Model
2.1 Goods Market
We consider a simple continuous time model of a closed economy, consisting of the firm
and the household sector. The household sector consists of two kinds of households – type 1
households consisting of workers, deriving income from wages, and type 2 and 3 households,
deriving their income from two kinds of financial assets, debt and equities respectively. The
aggregate demand at time t, AD (t), is composed of the total expenditure on investment and
consumption made by the firms and the households respectively, i.e. AD (t) = C (t)+I (t). A
firm finances its investment either internally out of retained earnings, or externally by issuing
debt and equity instruments. The national income, Y , might be measured by income method
as the sum of wages, W , and profits, P , i.e. Y (t) =W (t)+P (t). In terms of various sectors
in the economy, the total income might also be represented as Y (t) = Yf (t)+Yh1 (t)+Yh2 (t)+
Yh3 (t), where Yf , Yh1, Yh2 and Yh3 is the income to firms (profits after paying outstanding
debt commitments and dividends) and type 1, type 2 and type 3 households respectively.
In other words, Yf (t) = σP (t), where σ is the fraction of profits retained by firms; whereas
2See, for instance, Taylor & O’Connell (1985), Lavoie (1986-87), Foley (1987), Semmler (1987), Downe
(1987), Franke & Semmler (1989), Greenwald & Stiglitz (1993), Palley (1994), Skott (1994,
1995), Keen (1995, 1996), Andresen (1996, 1999), Vercelli (2000), Asada (2001), Lagunoff & Schreft
(2001), Arena & Raybaut (2001), Chiarella, Flaschel & Semmler (2001), Fazzari, Ferri & Green-
berg (2001), Gatti & Gallegati (2001), Foley (2003), Setterfield (2004), Datta (2005), Meirelles &
Lima (2006), Lima & Meirelles (2007), Fazzari, Ferri & Greenberg (2008), Taylor & von Arnim
(2008), Charles (2008b, 2008a), Guilmi, Gallegati & Landini (2009).
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Yh1 (t) = W (t), where W represents the wages; so that Yh2 (t) = (1− σ)P (t) − Yh3 (t),
with Yh2 and Yh3 being the part of profits representing return to financial assets (debt and
equities). If s1, s2 and s3 represent the fraction of the respective incomes saved by type 1, 2
& 3 households respectively, with s1 < s2 = s3, then we have
C (t) = (1− s1)W (t) + (1− s2) (1− σ)P (t) (1)
Assuming a regime of mark-up pricing, where the price per unit is obtained by adding a fixed
mark-up over the wage costs of production, we have
P (t) = ψY (t) (2)
where ψ is the share of profits in national income. Following a simple algebraic manipulation,
the consumption by the household sector can now be represented as C (t) = (1− s)Y (t),
where s = 1−{(1− s1) (1− ψ) + (1− s2) (1− σ)ψ} is the propensity to save out of national
income.
Let the potential output or the rate of capacity of production in the economy, Y ⋆, be defined
as the maximum output that can possibly be produced, given the existing constraints of
factors and a given technology. Assuming the availability of capital as the binding constraint
on production, we have Y ⋆ (t) = βK (t), where β is the output-capital ratio determined by
the existing technology. The actual level of output or the national income, Y , can now be
represented as Y (t) = min (AD (t) , Y ⋆ (t)). In other words, for all AD ≤ Y ⋆, aggregate
demand acts as the main constraint on the level of production and the output is determined
by the aggregate demand.
At the goods market equilibrium, the level of output measured by the income method
equals the aggregate demand, i.e. Y (t) = AD (t) so that W (t) + P (t) = C (t) + I (t).
Substituting the value of C from (1), we have
Y (t) =
1
s
I (t) (3)
Let the rate of capacity utilization be defined as the ratio of actual to potential output, i.e.
u (t) = Y (t)/Y ⋆ (t). We define the rate of investment,
g (t) ≡ I (t)
K (t)
(4)
From the definition of u, Y ⋆ and g, and the goods market equilibrium condition given in (3),
we have
g (t) = sβu (t) (5)
with a feasibility condition 0 ≤ u ≤ 1⇔ 0 ≤ g ≤ gmax, where gmax ≡ sβ represents the rate
of investment corresponding to full capacity utilization.
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Let g⋆, the desired rate of investment, depend directly and linearly on the rate of capacity
utilization, i.e. g⋆ (t) = γ¯ + γ (t) u (t). Substituting from (5), we have
g⋆ (t) = γ¯ +
γ (t) g (t)
sβ
(6)
where γ is the ‘financial accelerator’ or the sensitivity of the desired rate of investment, g⋆
to the rate of capacity utilization, u, and is determined by financial factors. γ¯, on the other
hand, due to reasons given by Dume´nil & Le´vy (1999, page 686), comprises the exogenous
component of investment. Next, we turn our attention to the financial sector.
2.2 Dynamics of Debt
Consider a simple model of debt dynamics. The total stock of outstanding debt commit-
ment in any given period, t, is given by a history of borrowing, B, at a rate of interest, r,
and repayment, R. If the rate of interest, r, as mentioned above, is given exogenously by the
Central Bank, then the stock of debt in period t is given by
D (t) =
t∫
τ=0
(B (τ)− R (τ)) er(t−τ)dτ (7)
which, with simple algebraic manipulation and differentiation with respect to t, reduces to
D˙ (t) = B (t)− R (t) + rD (t) (8)
Equation (8) provides us with the basic accounting identity describing the growth in stock of
debt. Next, we proceed to construct a macroeconomic index of financial fragility or gearing
ratio, in the form of a ratio of the level of indebtedness to the ability to pay for all the
debtors, i.e. the firm sector together.
In any time period, t, the firm sector’s total payment commitment consists of principal
and interest commitments. However, since the debt stock is accumulated over a period of
time, the debtors are expected to pay only a part of the total principal in a given period. For
each borrower, the minimum part of principal that is expected to be paid back in each period
would differ, and would, among other things, depend on a credit rating of the borrower by
the lenders. A borrower who is considered relatively safe (i.e. less likely to default) by the
lenders would be expected to pay a smaller fraction of the principal in each period than a
borrower who is considered relatively unsafe. In other words, borrowers with higher credit
ratings will have access to loans with longer terms, resulting in a proportionally smaller
minimum repayment requirements each period.
At the macroeconomic level, however, the lenders as a whole expect, in each time period,
an exogenously given minimum fraction of the total debt stock as repayment towards the
principal. Let this fraction be q of the total outstanding debt commitments. The interest
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commitments, on the other hand, are accumulated within the time period, and hence, are
expected to be fully paid. In any given period t, therefore, the total minimum payment
commitment of debtors is given by (q + r)D (t), where qD (t) and rD (t) is the principal
and interest component respectively. These payments are to be paid by the debtors out of
their current retained profits or the internal finance. In other words, current retained profits
are used to repay current payment commitments, and the residual determines the level of
retained profits in the next period. The macroeconomic index of financial fragility or gearing
ratio can now be represented as
λ (t) =
(q + r)D (t)
σP (t)
(9)
We define
d (t) ≡ D (t)
K (t)
(10)
as the stock of debt in intensive form. Substituting from (2), (3), (4) and (10) into (9), we
have
λ (t) =
(q + r) sd (t)
σψg (t)
(11)
The actual repayment in period t, denoted by R (t), however, is independent of (q + r)D (t).
It might either exceed or fall short of it, depending on the profile of the borrowers and re-
payment by individual borrowers. Let us consider a situation where a fraction φ (t) of the
total outstanding debt stock is repaid in period t, i.e.
R (t) = φ (t)D (t) (12)
This fraction, φ (t) depends on:
1. The ability of the firms to repay, given by the ratio of retained profits to the capital
stock, σP/K. A higher ratio of retained profits to capital stock would enable the bor-
rowers to repay a larger fraction of the outstanding debt commitments without altering
it’s capital structure (i.e. without taking recourse to additional external finance); and,
2. The level of the index of financial fragility, λ. Higher level of λ is associated with
a borrower profile where firms, in general, have higher gearing ratios, and hence, are
forced to repay back a higher fraction of outstanding debt stock. Thus, in aggregate,
a higher fraction of outstanding debt stock will actually be repaid back.
Based on these considerations, we suggest the following functional form for φ (t):
φ (t) = φ
(
σP (t)
K (t)
, λ (t)
)
; φσP/K > 0, φλ > 0 (13)
which, taking a linear functional form, might be expressed as
φ (t) = m
σP (t)
K (t)
λ (t)
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where m is constant. Substituting for the value of P (t) from (2) & (3), and for the value of
λ (t) from (9), we have φ (t) = m (q + r) (D (t)/K (t)), or,
φ (t) = m (q + r) d (t) (14)
Next, we turn to the borrowing function, B (t). In any given period t, let a fraction a (t)
of the total investment made by the firm sector be financed by fresh borrowing, i.e.
B (t) = a (t) I (t) (15)
The fraction, a (t), will be determined by the financial structure of the firms, i.e. the manner
in which the firms decide to finance fresh investments. To arrive at a particular level of
a (t) the firms need to take two kinds of decisions: (a) the decision on distribution of the
cost of investment between internal (i.e. retained profits) and external (i.e. debt and outside
equities) sources of finance; and, (b) the decision on how to distribute the proportion of
investment costs marked for external source between debt and equity financing. We first
note the following:
Proposition 1. For a given level of profits, a higher rate of investment would necessarily
mean a higher level of outside sources of finance.
Proof. Following a flow of funds approach, we note that the firm sector receives its funds
from retained profits, borrowing and equity financing, and uses these funds in making planned
investment, paying out outstanding debt commitments, and in unplanned accumulation of
inventories, i.e. σP (t) + B (t) + E (t) ≡ I (t) + R (t) + ∆N (t), where ∆N (t) represents
the unplanned accumulation of inventories by the firm sector in period t. Substituting
from (2), (3), (12) and (14), we have
B (t) + E (t) ≡
(
1− ψ
s
)
I (t) +m (q + r) {d (t)}2K (t) + ∆N (16)
⇒ ∂ (B (t) + E (t))
∂I (t)
≡
(
1− ψ
s
)
> 0 (17)
In other words, for a given level of profits, higher the level of investment higher would be the
use of outside sources of finance like debt and outside equities.
Further, though a detailed analysis of equity financing is beyond the scope of our analysis,
we note the following:
Remark 1. Between two sources of external finance, there might be an increasing preference
for debt as the rate of investment increases.
Remark 1 could be explained by the following:
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1. The main difference between debt and equities is with regard to the resulting payment
commitments. While the payment commitments arising out of debt commitments,
consisting of the principal and the interest, is independent of profits, the payment
commitments arising out of equity financing, consisting of dividends, (1− σ)P (t),
depend directly on profits. Hence, in periods of prosperity, characterized by a high
rate of both investment and profits (related through the multiplier from (3)), cost of
equity financing would be higher. In other words, any increase in investment would
increase the cost of equity financing faster than the cost of debt financing.
2. Further, as increases in investment leads to increased recourse to external financing
from proposition 1, the managers of the firms might be averse to continue increasing
the dilution of shareholding from equity financing. Since a dilution of shareholding, by
changing the ownership structure, increases the threat of hostile takeovers and change
in corporate controls (provided, of course, such markets exist), managers might prefer
debt financing when the requirement of external financing is higher.
It should be pointed out that proposition 1 and remark 1, taken together, establishes a
direct relationship between the fraction of investment cost in any period, a (t), financed by
debt, B (t). In addition, we also note the following:
Remark 2. An increase in the level of financial fragility, λ, might necessitate financing a
higher proportion of the cost of investment through debt.
We should note that remark 2 is motivated by the relationship implied in (13). A higher
level of financial fragility, λ, from (13), will imply that a higher fraction outstanding debt
commitments will have to be repaid in the current period. This will require a higher level
of borrowing, to be used not only towards meeting the cost of investment but also towards
repaying outstanding debt commitments.
From proposition 1 and remark 1 and 2, we suggest the following functional form for a (t):
a (t) = a (g (t) , λ (t)) ; ag > 0, aλ > 0 (18)
which, taking a linear functional form and substituting from (2), (3) and (11), might be
expressed as
a (t) =
k (q + r) s
σψ
d (t) (19)
where k is a constant. Substituting from (12), (14), (15) and (19) into (8), we have
d˙ (t) =
[{
k (q + r) s
σψ
− 1
}
g (t)−m (q + r) d (t) + r
]
d (t) (20)
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2.3 Financial Determinants of Investment
We now turn our attention to the financial determinants of the rate of investment. Con-
sider the process of assessment of loan application by lenders. Any decision on such an
application, in the form of an approval or lack of it, would involve a detailed analysis of
the creditworthiness of the loan application. While the actual process of an assessment
of creditworthiness can be quite complicated3, we consider a simple version of this process
here. Broadly, the quantitative factors determining the creditworthiness of a loan application
might be categorized into two classes: those which remain unchanged across various stages
of a business cycle; and, those which vary as an economy moves through a business cycle.
In the first category, which might be considered as a preliminary assessment by the lending
institutions, we might include permanent factors like the credit history and reputation of an
individual, or a group of individuals. Based on these factors, the lending institutions assign
a credit rating or score to the borrowers. A borrower might be classified as either prime or
sub-prime through such a process. Once classified, the identity of a borrower does not change
across various stages of the business cycle; in other words, a change in the rate of capacity
utilization will have no impact on this identity of the borrower. However, the final decision
on creditworthiness, in addition to above, is also likely to consider an additional component
that includes current determinants. This would include, for instance, the current income of
the loan applicant and an assessment of the expected future income. Assessment of future
income might include, among other things, the expected profitability and risk associated
with the investment project for which the borrower seeks a loan. As would be evident, these
factors would vary across various stages in a business cycle; in particular, it would depend
on the current rate of capacity utilization.
We begin by attempting to formalize the first, i.e. the fixed component of creditworthiness.
As we noted above, this depends on an individual credit rating of each borrower. Conse-
quently, consider the portfolio of a lender; this portfolio will be characterized by a certain
spread of prime or safe, and sub-prime or risky borrowers. This might be formalized by
introducing η, an indicator of the proportion of borrowers with high perceived risk of default
in the overall debt portfolio, such that η ∈ [0, 1]. A higher value of η would imply a greater
proportion of borrowers with high perceived risk of default in the macroeconomic distribution
of debt.
Here we recall that one of the main arguments made in the Fisher-Minsky story described
earlier was that periods of relative prosperity might be accompanied with a gradual worsening
of the profile of borrowers, leading to inclusion of borrowers with higher perceived risk of
default (i.e. the sub-prime borrowers). This inclusion of sub-prime borrowers would be quite
evident if the prudential norms followed by the lenders are fixed at an absolute level. For
instance, if having access to a particular value of loan requires furnishing a fixed amount of
3See, for instance, Kalapodas & Thomson (2006) and Abrahams & Zhang (2009) for a discussion of the
process of credit risk assessment.
9
collateral, it is clear that a greater number of potential borrowers would be able to provide the
required collaterals, and hence, have access to loan in periods of prosperity. In other words,
those excluded by the debt market during periods with lower levels of economic activity
would be included during periods of prosperity. The prudential norms, however, typically do
not remain fixed but, in fact, are relaxed during periods of prosperity, because of optimistic
expectations. Apart from a direct relaxation, financial innovation and predatory lending
practices by organized lenders during a boom and emergence of new financial instruments
might aid such relaxation of prudential norms during periods of prosperity (see, for instance,
Kregel 2008, Shiller 2008, Abrahams & Zhang 2009, Reinhart & Rogoff 2009, Akerlof &
Shiller 2010). This reinforces the impact of a phase of prosperity in increasing the proportion
of risky borrowers in the macroeconomic distribution of debt.
Next, we formalize the above argument. Since the period of prosperity, as defined through-
out our analysis, is characterized by an increase in u, Y and g, we suggest the following
functional formulation for the proportion of risky borrowers, η in the portfolio:
η (t) = ηgg (t) (21)
where ηg is a constant such that ηg ∈
]
0, 1
gmax
]
.
We now construct a cumulative index of risk of default by including the impact of η, as
defined above in (21), and the macroeconomic indicator of financial fragility, λ, as defined
in (9), as follows:
Λ (t) = Ληη (t) + Λλλ (t) (22)
where Λη and Λλ represent the sensitivity of the cumulative index of risk of default to η and
λ respectively.
One should note that the cumulative index of risk of default, Λ, consist of two separate
risk components. These two components might be interpreted as emerging from two different
kinds of risks involved in credit expansion. The first, or the proportion of risky borrowers
in the macroeconomic distribution of debt or η, might be considered an indicator of risk in-
volved in credit widening, i.e. inclusion of new borrowers, some of whom might be considered
subprime. The second, the macroeconomic indicator of financial fragility or λ, on the other
hand, might be considered a more conventional financial ratio that takes into account both
credit deepening and credit widening. Hence, taken together, Λ might be considered a more
comprehensive macroeconomic indicator of risk of default than some of the conventional
indicators, since it takes into account both credit deepening and credit widening.
There are two ways the rate of investment might be affected by the risk of default. Firstly,
as we have argued before, the managers are concerned with the risk of default, since in
case of a default, a firm might face a hostile takeover, leading to a change in corporate
control threatening the job of the managers. Hence, an increase in Λ might prompt the
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managers to respond by reducing the sensitivity of the rate of investment to the capacity
utilization, i.e. the accelerator. Secondly, the lenders are concerned with the risk of default.
An increase in a macroeconomic indicator of the risk of default like Λ is likely to make them
more cautious about lending. In light of a substantial literature in this area (see, for instance
Kalecki 1937, Hodgman 1960, Catt 1965, Stiglitz & Weiss 1981, Stiglitz & Weiss 1983, Jaffee
& Stiglitz 1990, Stiglitz & Weiss 1992), we might note that a rationing and red-lining of credit
might be one of the possible responses from the lenders under such a situation. While such
a rationing and red- lining will directly affect only a section of borrowers, all borrowers are
likely to take steps to reduce the possibility of being rationed and red-lined. Since individual
or firm-level gearing ratio is one of the deciding factors on which firms are rationed or red-
lined, an increase in Λ is likely to induce individual firms to respond by trying to reduce
their gearing ratios. Since this logic applies to all the firms, an increase in Λ will have a
negative impact on the accelerator of the investment function. We formalize this argument
by introducing the following formulation for the accelerator:
γ (t) = µ¯− µˆΛ (t) (23)
where µˆ is the sensitivity of the accelerator to the cumulative risk of default, and µ¯ represents
the maximum possible level of the accelerator, when there is no risk of default. Substituting
the values of λ (t) and η (t) from (11) and (21) into (22), and then substituting the resultant
expression into (23), we have
γ (t) = µ¯− µˆΛηηgg (t)− µˆΛλ (q + r) s
σψ
d (t)
g (t)
(24)
Substituting the value of accelerator, γ (t), from (24) into the investment function in (6), we
have
g⋆ (t) =
µ¯
sβ
g (t)− µˆΛηηg
sβ
{g (t)}2 − µˆΛλ (q + r)
σψβ
d (t) + γ¯ (25)
Let the rate of investment be continuously adjusted so as to meet a fraction, h, of the gap
between the actual and the desired rate of investment, i.e.
g˙ (t)
g (t)
= h (g⋆ (t)− g (t)) (26)
subject to the feasibility condition 0 ≤ g ≤ gmax, where h represents the speed of adjustment
of the actual investment to the desired level by the investors. Substituting the value of g⋆ (t)
from (25) into (26), we have the following equation of motion to represent the dynamics of
the rate of investment:
g˙ (t) =
[(
µ¯
sβ
− 1
)
g (t)− µˆΛηηg
sβ
{g (t)}2 − µˆΛλ (q + r)
σψβ
d (t) + γ¯
]
hg (t) (27)
subject to the feasibility condition, 0 ≤ g (t) ≤ gmax.
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3 Complete Model
From (27) and (20), we get the following 2× 2 dynamical system:
g˙ (t) =
[(
µ¯
sβ
− 1
)
g (t)− µˆΛηηg
sβ
{g (t)}2 − µˆΛλ (q + r)
σψβ
d (t) + γ¯
]
hg (t)
d˙ (t) =
[{
k (q + r) s
σψ
− 1
}
g (t)−m (q + r) d (t) + r
]
d (t)
(28)
which we rewrite as follows:
g˙ (t) =
[
a1g (t)− a2 {g (t)}2 − a3d (t) + a4
]
hg (t)
d˙ (t) = [b1g (t)− b2d (t) + b3] d (t) (29)
where a1 ≡ µ¯sβ−1, a2 ≡ µˆΛηηgsβ , a3 ≡ µˆΛλ(q+r)σψβ , a4 ≡ γ¯, b1 ≡ k(q+r)sσψ − 1, b2 ≡ m (q + r) , b3 ≡
r, with a1, a2, a3, a4, b1, b2, b3 ∈ ]0,∞[. It might be noted that the dynamics in (29) resembles
that of the generalized predator-prey or Kolmogorov-Lotka-Volterra class of models. The
debt-capital ratio, d is the predator that feeds on the rate of investment, g. We should
point out here that (29) contains at least two financial dampeners to mitigate the positive
impact of the accelerator on the rate of investment, g, or the prey: firstly, the debt-capital
ratio, which works through the indicator of financial fragility, λ; and secondly, the rate of
investment itself for all g > a1/2a2, which works through the index of risk of default. We
should also note that the rate of investment here plays a dual role; it has a positive role on
itself through the accelerator, on the other hand, it also has a self-limiting negative role on
itself through the risk of default. The self-limiting role originates in the arguments found
in the Fisher-Minsky hypothesis described in section 1. Solving for the steady state of the
dynamical system (29), we have:
E1 :
(
g¯1, d¯1
)
= (0, 0) (30a)
E2 :
(
g¯2, d¯2
)
=
(
−
√
4 a2 a4+a21−a1
2 a2
, 0
)
(30b)
E3 :
(
g¯3, d¯3
)
=
(√
4 a2 a4+a21+a1
2 a2
, 0
)
(30c)
E4 :
(
g¯4, d¯4
)
=
(
0, b3
b2
)
(30d)
E5 :
(
g¯5, d¯5
)
=
(
−
√
4 a2 b22 a4−4 a2 b2 a3 b3+b
2
1 a
2
3−2 a1 b1 b2 a3+a
2
1 b
2
2+b1 a3−a1 b2
2 a2 b2
,
− b1
√
4 a2 b22 a4−4 a2 b2 a3 b3+b
2
1 a
2
3−2 a1 b1 b2 a3+a
2
1 b
2
2−2 a2 b2 b3+b
2
1 a3−a1 b1 b2
2 a2 b22
)
(30e)
E6 :
(
g¯6, d¯6
)
=
(√
4 a2 b22 a4−4a2 b2 a3 b3+b
2
1 a
2
3−2 a1 b1 b2 a3+a
2
1 b
2
2−b1 a3+a1 b2
2 a2 b2
,
b1
√
4 a2 b22 a4−4 a2 b2 a3 b3+b
2
1 a
2
3−2 a1 b1 b2 a3+a
2
1 b
2
2+2 a2 b2 b3−b
2
1 a3+a1 b1 b2
2 a2 b22
)
(30f)
It would be evident that E2 /∈ ℜ2++ since g¯2 < 0. Hence we do not discuss E2 any further
in the following sections. Further, E3 and E4 are non-negative and lie on the g and d axis
respectively. Regarding E5 and E6, we note the following:
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Remark 3. Whenever E5 and E6 are real and distinct, d˙/d = 0 must intersect g˙/g = 0 from
above at E5 and from below at E6. If E5 and E6 are not distinct, then d˙/d = 0 is a tangent
to g˙/g = 0 at the point representing the unique non-trivial steady state.
Remark 4. a3b3 < a4b2 is a sufficient (though not necessary) condition for the non-trivial
steady state E6 to be inside the real positive orthant, ℜ2++.
Remark 5. For g (t) ≥ g¯3, we have g˙ (t) ≤ 0 for all d (t) ∈ ℜ+; in other words, if g¯3 ≤ gmax,
then the feasibility condition 0 ≤ g (t) ≤ gmax is always satisfied.
For any (g◦, d◦) ∈ int ℜ2++ as the initial point, let the solution to (29) be represented by
Θ (t) = (g (t) , d (t) ; g◦, d◦). From (29), we can conclude the following about the behavior of
trajectories in case the initial point is on one of the axes:
(a) g˙ > 0, d˙ = 0 ∀ {(g◦, d◦) : g◦ ∈ ]0, g¯3[ , d◦ = 0} as the initial point.
(b) g˙ < 0, d˙ = 0 ∀ {(g◦, d◦) : g◦ ∈ ]g¯3,∞[ , d◦ = 0} as the initial point.
(c) g˙ = 0, d˙ > 0 ∀ {(g◦, d◦) : g◦ = 0, d◦ ∈ ]0, d¯4[} as the initial point.
(d) g˙ = 0, d˙ < 0 ∀ {(g◦, d◦) : g◦ = 0, d◦ ∈ ]d¯4,∞[} as the initial point.
(31)
i.e. both the g-axis and the d-axis are trajectories. Since trajectories cannot cross each other,
this would make the real positive orthant invariant, i.e. trajectories starting from an initial
point in the real positive orthant will always remain within it. Given that only dynamics
strictly within the real positive orthant is economically meaningful, we focus our attention
on only such trajectories and ignore other trajectories in the rest of our discussion. In other
words, among the steady states listed in (30), we only consider E5 and E6 for discussion,
and do not discuss the other steady states in the rest of this study.
Next we turn our attention to the trajectories starting from an initial point inside the real
positive orthant. For g, d 6= 0, from (29) we have
g˙ (t) ⋚ 0 ⇔ d (t) R a1
a3
g (t)− a2
a3
{g (t)}2 + a4
a3
d˙ (t) ⋚ 0 ⇔ d (t) R b1
b2
g (t) +
b3
b2
(32)
Depending on the configuration of parameters, we can list four different possibilities exhibit-
ing qualitatively different dynamics (See figure 1):
1. Case 1: Here, a4b2 − a3b3 > 0, i.e. intercept of g˙/g = 0 is greater than that of d˙/d = 0,
and b1/b2 > (a1 − 2a2g¯6) /a3 > 0, i.e. d˙/d = 0 intersects g˙/g = 0 from below in the
positively sloped section of the latter curve. E6 ∈ intℜ2++ is the only steady state in
this case inside the real positive orthant.
2. Case 2: Here, a4b2 − a3b3 > 0, i.e. intercept of g˙/g = 0 is greater than that of d˙/d = 0,
but unlike case 1, (a1 − 2a2g¯6) /a3 < 0 < b1/b2, i.e. d˙/d = 0 intersects g˙/g = 0 from
below in the negatively sloped section of the latter curve. E6 ∈ intℜ2++ is the unique
steady state inside the real positive orthant.
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Figure 1: Phase diagram of (29): Four cases
3. Case 3: Here, a4b2−a3b3 < 0, i.e. intercept of g˙/g = 0 is less than that of d˙/d = 0, and
(a1 − 2a2g¯5) /a3 > b1/b2 > 0 > (a1 − 2a2g¯6) /a3, i.e. g˙/g = 0 intersects d˙/d = 0 from
below at E5 when the former is sloping upward, and from above at E6 when the former
is sloping downward. In this case, E5, E6 ∈ intℜ2++, i.e. d˙/d = 0 intersects g˙/g = 0
twice in the interior of the real positive orthant.
4. Case 4: Here, a4b2 − a3b3 < 0, i.e. intercept of g˙/g = 0 is less than that of d˙/d = 0,
and, unlike case 3, E5, E6 /∈ intℜ2++ so that there does not exist any steady state in the
interior of the real positive orthant. Since we are interested in only the real positive
orthant, we do not discuss case 4 any further in the rest of our discussion.
Further, performing the Routh-Hurwitz test for local stability on the two economically
meaningful steady states, E5 and E6, we note that (a) whenever the non-trivial steady state
solution, E5 exists and is distinct from E6 and lies in the interior of real positive orthant,
it is a saddle-point; and, (b) depending on the configuration of the parameters, the non-
trivial steady state solution, E6, whenever it exists and is distinct from E5 and lies within
the interior of the real positive orthant, is either a source or a sink. We further note that E6
is always a sink in case 2 and 3.
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4 Possibilities of Cyclical Behavior
Next, we investigate possibilities of growth cycles emerging from an interaction between
the investment function and debt dynamics. For this purpose, we restrict our attention to
case 1 of figure 1 since, from above, this is the only case where cyclical possibilities exist.
We recall that this is the case where E6 is the unique steady state in the interior of positive
orthant, and at E6, the positive impact of g on g˙/g outweighs its negative impact.
Cyclical possibilities in dynamical systems of the type represented by (28) or (29) have
been investigated extensively in Datta (2012). Here we present a summary of these results:
1. For the dynamical system represented by (28) or (29), we define a critical value of the
parameter h given by hˆ, where h represents the rate of adjustment of the actual rate
of investment to its desired rate by the private investors and hˆ is defined as follows:
hˆ =
b2d¯6
(a1 − 2a2g¯6) g¯6 > 0 (33)
which, by substituting the values of g¯6 and d¯6 from (30), might be expanded as
hˆ =
b1 b2
√
4 a2 b
2
2
a4−4 a2 b2 a3 b3+b
2
1
a2
3
−2 a1 b1 b2 a3+a
2
1
b2
2
+2 a2 b
2
2 b3−b
2
1 b2 a3+a1 b1 b
2
2
(2 b1 a3−a1 b2)
√
4 a2 b
2
2
a4−4 a2 b2 a3 b3+b
2
1
a2
3
−2 a1 b1 b2 a3+a
2
1
b2
2
−4 a2 b
2
2
a4+4a2 b2 a3 b3−2 b
2
1
a2
3
+3 a1 b1 b2 a3−a
2
1
b2
2
(34)
At h = hˆ, we have a point of non-degenerate Andronov-Hopf bifurcation, leading to
emergence of limit cycles.
2. Depending on the values of various parameters, the Andronov-Hopf bifurcation is either
supercritical or subcritical, leading to emergence of either stable or unstable limit cycles
respectively. Whether the Andronov-Hopf bifurcation is stable or unstable can be
determined if we are provided with information on the values of various parameters.4
3. In case the limit cycle emerging from Andronov-Hopf bifurcation is unstable, we have
another stable limit cycle enclosing the unstable limit cycle.
4. For h > hˆ, we have a stable limit cycle from an application of Poincare´-Bendixson
theorem.
In other words, there exists a unique stable limit cycle for all h ≥ hˆ.
4For instance, if the parameters have values as follows:
s = 0.3, σ = 0.4, ψ = 0.3, r = 0.1, q = 0.6, m = 0.6, k = 0.7,
β = 0.8, µ¯ = 0.3, µˆ = 0.4, ηg = 0.1, Λη = 0.1, Λλ = 0.63, γ¯ = 0.5.
then at the non-trivial steady state, E6, the rate of investment, g¯6, is at 8.49% and the debt-capital
ratio is at 28.36%. The Poincare´-Andronov-Hopf bifurcation for this steady state occurs at h = 5.67,
leading to the emergence of limit cycles. The first lyapunov exponent at this point can be calculated to
be −1.02× 10−5, which is negative; hence, the Andronov-Hopf bifurcation is supercritical and the limit
cycles are stable.
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We should further note, given that the limit cycle is to be interpreted as a growth cycle in
the rate of investment, g, and the debt-capital ratio, d, we have a robust result for existence
of a growth cycle. The growth cycle emerges under a wide range of conditions, i.e. for all
h ≥ hˆ, irrespective of the values of other parameters, and for a very wide range of initial
conditions.
We next turn to the implication of this result, by looking closely at some of the properties
of this growth cycle.
5 Business and Financial Cycles
We noticed in section 4 a variety of cyclical possibilities. We now turn our attention to
the behavior of the economy through various stages of a business cycle.
5.1 Business Cycles
Figure 2: An Economic Cycle
5.1.1 Stage 1: Period of high growth
In this stage, there is an increase in both the rate of investment, g and the debt-capital
ratio, d. Following a recent history of high growth phase (see figure 2), this phase is also
accompanied with an all-round optimistic expectations. However, this phase also contains
conditions for a worsening of financial variables in the following ways:
1. An increase in d, ceteris paribus, leads to an increase in financial fragility, λ. This leads
to an increase in the cumulative index of risk of default, Λ.
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2. An increase in g, as argued above, will lead to an increased inclusion of risky or subprime
borrowers, resulting in a fall in the profile of borrowers. In our model, this is captured
by an increase in the proportion of risky borrowers, η. This will further put an upward
pressure on the cumulative risk of default, Λ.
As we have argued above, an increase in Λ creates a negative impact on the rate of investment,
g, in our model. This negative impact occurs because of two sets of reasons. Firstly, as we
have argued before, the managers are concerned with the risk of default, since in case of
a default, a firm might face a hostile takeover, leading to a change in corporate control
threatening the job of the managers. Hence, an increase in Λ might prompt the managers to
respond by reducing the sensitivity of the rate of investment to the capacity utilization, i.e.
the accelerator. Secondly, the lenders are concerned with the risk of default. An increase in
a macroeconomic indicator of the risk of default like Λ is likely to make them more cautious
about lending, possibly leading to a rationing and red-lining of credit. While such a rationing
and red-lining will directly affect only a section of borrowers, all borrowers are likely to take
steps to reduce the possibility of being rationed and red- lined. Since individual or firm-
level gearing ratio is one of the deciding factors on which firms are rationed or red-lined, an
increase in Λ is likely to induce individual firms to respond by trying to reduce their gearing
ratios. Since this logic applies to all the firms, an increase in Λ will have a negative impact
on the accelerator of the investment function.
The negative impact, however, will be offset in this stage by the positive impact of an
increase in g. Primarily this will operate through an increased demand having a positive
impact on investment through a combination of the multiplier and the accelerator. There
will also be an indirect positive impact: an increase in g, by increasing retained earnings,
ceteris paribus, will have a negative impact on financial fragility and risk of default, which
in turn will have a positive impact on the rate of investment, g.
5.1.2 Stage 2: Onset of a financial crisis
This stage begins when the negative factor discussed above starts dominating the positive
factors, resulting in a fall in the rate of investment, g. A fall in g would lead to a reduction
in borrowing, imparting a negative impact on the debt-capital ratio, d. The negative impact
on d will be further reinforced by an increase in λ forcing an increase in repayment of debt.
However, the negative impact on d will lead to an actual decrease in d only with a lag. Till
that happens, the economy will be characterized by classis features of onset of an economic
crisis: a fall in the rate of investment along with an increase in debt-capital ratio.
5.1.3 Stage 3: Full-blown recession
In this stage, g continues to fall. The negative factors on d discussed above finally results
in a fall in d. In other words, both the rate of investment and the debt-capital ratio falls in
this stage. Conditions for a turnaround and recovery, however, are also created in this stage.
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This would primarily operate through an improvement in financial variables in the following
manner:
1. A decrease in d, cateris paribus, leads to a decrease in the financial fragility, captured
by λ. This leads to a reduction in the cumulative index of risk of default, Λ.
2. A decrease in g, implying a recession, will lead to fall in the proportion of risky or
subprime borrowers, leading to a rise in η. This would primarily operate through a
process of exclusion from the debt market. In other words, recession would lead to
exclusion of those borrowers who might have had access to loans during better times.
This would lead to a fall in the cumulative index of risk of default, Λ.
One should expect a fall in Λ to have a positive impact on the rate of investment, g. Such
an expectation should follow from a straightforward and symmetric application of the logic
provided above in our discussion of stage 1. Firstly, a decrease in the risk of default would re-
duce fear of defaults and takeover for the managers of the firms, allowing them to invest more
aggressively. Secondly, the lenders, faced with a reduced risk of default, might eventually
reduce credit rationing and red-lining, allowing the firms to borrow and invest more.
The positive impact on g, however, is offset by the negative impact of a decrease in
g. This will primarily operate through a situation of reduced demand having a negative
impact through multiplier and the accelerator. Further, a fall in g, by reducing profits and
retained earnings, will also tend to increase the financial fragility, λ (where g appears in the
denominator), which, through the investment function, will have further negative impact on
g. The negative effect will dominate in this stage.
One also needs to exercise a bit of caution here in a symmetric application of the logic
provided in stage 1. Unlike the process of inclusion of risky borrowers in stage 1, (which leads
to an immediate impact), their exclusion is not as straightforward. This is because despite
their exclusion from fresh borrowing, the risky borrowers who have already borrowed will
still remain in the market. Further, unlike the process of inclusion, the process of exclusion
might also lead to these borrowers facing a payment crisis, leading to various complications
beyond the scope of analysis of our model. In other words, there is an element of assymmetry
in an increase and a decrease in η - a fact which is not captured in our model.
5.1.4 Stage 4: Recovery
This stage begins when the factors having a positive impact on g discussed above starts
dominating, leading to an increase in g. The debt-capital ratio, d, however will continue to
fall. An increase in g, by increasing borrowing will have a positive impact on d. This will
be further reinforced by a fall in d reducing λ, and hence repayments. However these effects
will lead to an actual increase in d only with a lag. Till that happens, the economy will be
in a purely recovery path, with the rate of investment, g increasing along with a continuing
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fall in the debt-capital ratio, d. Once there is a turnaround in d, the economy leaves stage 4
and re-enters stage 1.
The dynamics of g and d through various stages of cycle are shown below in figure 3 and 4
respectively.
Figure 3: The rate of investment through a business cycle
Figure 4: The debt-capital ratio through a business cycle
5.2 Financial Cycles
It would be evident from above discussion that the financial sector, in the form of debt
market, plays an important role in the business cycle. Hence, we would expect a financial
cycle to accompany the business cycle. However, as we find out below, the financial cycle is
not synchronized with the business cycle (i.e. the cycle in g) but in fact precedes the latter.
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This is best captured by the index of financial fragility, λ in our model. We recall from (11)
that the index of financial fragility, λ is given by
λ =
k (q + r) sd
σψg
Taking logarithmic differentiation of both sides, we have
λ˙
λ
=
d˙
d
− g˙
g
(35)
From (35), it would be clear that λ starts stage 1 by decreasing till it reaches a trough, and
then starts increasing within stage 1. It continues to increase through stage 2 and beginning
of stage 3. Within stage 3, it reaches a peak and then starts declining. This decline in λ
continues through stage 4 into stage 1. This is shown in figure 5.
Figure 5: A financial cycle
It would be clear that the cycle in λ precedes the cycle in g. For instance, in stage 1,
the turnaround in λ occurs when it starts increasing in the middle of stage 1. However, the
turnaround in g occurs only at the end of stage 1 when g starts falling. Similarly, while the
next turnaround in λ occurs in the middle of stage 3 when it starts, falling, the turnaround
in g occurs only at the end of stage 3. The lag between two cycles is shown in figure 6, where
both the business and the financial cycles are superimposed on each other. This also seems
to fit in well with the general observation that a financial crisis typically works as a precursor
to a general economic crisis.
6 Concluding Remarks: A Reconsideration of
Fisher-Minsky Hypothesis
The model developed in this study includes the primary contention of the Fisher-Minsky
hypothesis, that there is a deterioration of financial variables during boom, captured by
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Figure 6: Lag between financial and business cycles
an increase in Λ. In addition, it also offers a macroeconomic mechanism by which this
deterioration of financial variables might put an end to the boom. We find that such a
macroeconomic mechanism, in addition to providing endogenous bounds, also leads to growth
cycles, involving cyclical behavior in rate of investment and debt-capital ratio. Further, we
find that a financial cycle would typically precede cycles in the rate of investment and output.
Thus, our model offers an endogenous explanation for turnarounds in business cycles driven
by financial factors, and hence, preceded by a financial cycle. A boom will end, for instance,
when a deterioration in financial variables will induce a cutback in the rate of investment.
The end to the boom, therefore, will be preceded by a financial crisis. In this sense, we
might offer our model as providing a more complete story of finance-led growth cycles than
the existing literature around the Fisher-Minsky hypothesis. Since it explains some of the
missing links without resorting to some of the less than convincing routes often found in
some of the literature, we might consider this as a substantial contribution to the literature
in this area.
We should, however, exercise a bit of caution while drawing conclusions from our model
developed above. Firstly, we should note that, while in our model the turnaround at the peak
and the trough of the growth cycle is treated in a symmetric manner, in real world a number
of complications might make such a symmetric treatment unwarranted. As we noted earlier,
the exclusion of subprime borrowers, unlike their inclusion, often involves a time-lag. While
the lenders might exclude new borrowers from having access to fresh borrowing, existing
subprime borrowers can be excluded only with a time-lag, i.e. only after the existing debt
contracts have expired. Further, exclusion of these borrowers might trigger off an all-round
payment crisis in the economy, creating further complications. Thus, typically in a real
world economy, while the end to the boom might occur endogenously, the end to a recession
often requires state intervention in the form of writing off existing loans or playing the
role of lender-of-last-resort. Secondly, the model developed above does not include income
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distribution considerations and the role of expectations leading to changes in asset prices. In
light of a substantial literature in this area, we should note that such considerations might
play a significant role in these growth cycles. This is an area we reserve for future research.
In other words, the model presented in this paper should primarily be looked upon as an
investigation into the nature of macroeconomic feedback mechanism between an investment
function and debt dynamics. Such a feedback mechanism is able to provide an endogenous
bound to the rate of investment, and in this sense, fills a gap in the existing literature
attempting to model the Fisher-Minsky hypothesis.
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